Meeting Report: Risk Assessment of Tamiflu Use Under Pandemic Conditions by Singer, Andrew C. et al.
Under the guidance of the World Health
Organization (WHO), 41 nations have devel-
oped pandemic preparedness plans describing
the role different organizations will play when
confronted with an influenza pandemic
[European Influenza Surveillance Scheme
(EISS) 2007; Mounier-Jack et al. 2007]. The
plans aim to maintain essential services, reduce
disease transmission and the socioeconomic
consequences of a pandemic, and minimize
the number of infectious cases, hospitaliza-
tions, and deaths (EISS 2007; Mounier-Jack
et al. 2007). 
The WHO has strongly recommended
the use of the antiviral Tamiﬂu, produced and
distributed by F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.
(Basel, Switzerland), as the primary choice for
combating an influenza pandemic (WHO
2006a). Tamiflu was recommended because
a) there is low natural viral resistance (Aoki
et al. 2007; Roberts 2001); b) it is easy to
administer orally via capsule; c) it is systemi-
cally active; and d) it is effective against char-
acterized influenza A and B viruses (Ward
et al. 2005; WHO 2006b). International
stockpiles of inﬂuenza A antivirals have been
growing rapidly since 2005 (Figure 1), and
most countries are stockpiling sufﬁcient quan-
tities of antiviral to treat 25% of their popula-
tion (Department of Health and Human
Services 2006; Ferguson et al. 2006; Roche
2007). Stockpiles are anticipated to continue
to increase toward a 50% coverage goal in
some countries. In addition, stockpiles are
likely to diversify, incorporating additional
neuraminidase inhibitors (NAI) such as
zanamivir (Relenza; GlaxoSmithKline,
London, UK) (Ferraris et al. 2005) and
peramivir (Biocryst Pharmaceuticals, Cary,
NC, USA) (Smee and Sidwell 2002), as well
as traditional antivirals such as amantadine
and rimantadine (WHO 2007). 
The United Kingdom has stockpiled 14.6
million courses of Tamiﬂu, equating to nearly
11 metric tons of oseltamivir ethylester-phos-
phate (OE-P), all of which is expected to be
used for treatment during the 9- to 12-week
period of a pandemic. OE-P use has been
identified as a potentially unacceptable risk,
and various potential effects and exposures
are associated with oseltamivir carboxylate
(OC) (Singer et al. 2007). The following cri-
teria have been used to assess the risks posed
by OE-P use during an inﬂuenza pandemic:
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On 3 October 2007, 40 participants with diverse expertise attended the workshop Tamiﬂu and the
Environment: Implications of Use under Pandemic Conditions to assess the potential human health
impact and environmental hazards associated with use of Tamiﬂu during an inﬂuenza pandemic.
Based on the identiﬁcation and risk-ranking of knowledge gaps, the consensus was that oseltamivir
ethylester-phosphate (OE-P) and oseltamivir carboxylate (OC) were unlikely to pose an eco-
toxicologic hazard to freshwater organisms. OC in river water might hasten the generation of OC-
resistance in wildfowl, but this possibility seems less likely than the potential disruption that could
be posed by OC and other pharmaceuticals to the operation of sewage treatment plants. The work-
group members agreed on the following research priorities: a) available data on the ecotoxicology of
OE-P and OC should be published; b) risk should be assessed for OC-contaminated river water gen-
erating OC-resistant viruses in wildfowl; c) sewage treatment plant functioning due to microbial
inhibition by neuraminidase inhibitors and other antimicrobials used during a pandemic should be
investigated; and d) realistic worst-case exposure scenarios should be developed. Additional modeling
would be useful to identify localized areas within river catchments that might be prone to high
pharmaceutical concentrations in sewage treatment plant efﬂuent. Ongoing seasonal use of Tamiﬂu
in Japan offers opportunities for researchers to assess how much OC enters and persists in the
aquatic environment. Key words: antiviral, drug, ecotoxicology, inﬂuenza, pandemic, pharmaceutical,
pollution, sewage treatment plant, Tamiflu. Environ Health Perspect 116:1563–1567 (2008).
doi:10.1289/ehp.11310 available via http://dx.doi.org/ [Online 30 May 2008]• Renal and fecal excretion of the oral dose of
OE-P is in its active antiviral form OC (F.
Hoffmann-La Roche 2007) 
• Negligible biotransformation of OC in
sewage treatment plants (STPs) [European
Medicines Agency (EMEA) 2005; Fick 2007]
• Low sorption of OC into sewage sludge
(low Log P) and high water solubility
(F. Hoffmann-La Roche 2007) 
• Negligible biodegradation of OC in river
water (Accinelli et al. 2007) 
• Insufﬁcient dilution of OC in many of the
examined receiving river waters to obviate
ecotoxicologic risks (Singer et al. 2007).
Preliminary hazard characterization. It
has been suggested that the release of OC into
rivers generates OC resistance in avian
inﬂuenza in wildfowl (Singer et al. 2007). OC
could enter the gut of wildfowl from ingested
river water and interact with the avian
influenza neuraminidase. The concentration
of OC in the gut might be higher than in
river water owing to recycling of the urine in
waterfowl, thereby further increasing the
selection pressure for OC resistance. 
The workshop, Tamiﬂu and the Environ-
ment: Implications of Use under Pandemic
Conditions, was designed to further charac-
terize the hazards and risks associated with
the projected scale of Tamiflu release to the
environment during a pandemic, as well as to
identify priorities for further research. It was
recognized by the workshop’s organizers that
a holistic assessment of risks could be made
best by bringing together diverse experts and
organizations with relevant experience.
Accordingly, experts in environmental
chemistry, ecotoxicology, virology, micro-
biology, enzymology, hydrology, public
health protection, and wastewater engineering
were invited to participate. The pharmaceuti-
cal industry, the water industry, and central
government were represented, together with a
wide variety of organizations advising and
supporting these sectors. 
Overview
To ensure that all participants had the knowl-
edge base required, plenary talks provided an
overview of the current understanding of the
processes and hazards associated with OC
release to the environment.
In selected U.S. and U.K. catchments dur-
ing an inﬂuenza pandemic, the predicted envi-
ronmental concentration (PEC) of OC
depends on population size and liters of river
water available for dilution of sewage efﬂuent
per capita. Concentrations of OC in catch-
ments with particularly low flow and high
populations are predicted to be > 20 µg/L,
which is signiﬁcantly higher than that observed
for most other pharmaceutical contaminants.
OC may possibly affect the function and sta-
bility of sewage treatment plants (STPs) as a
result of the inhibition of ﬂoc or bioﬁlm for-
mation, as these microbial growth forms are
integral to process stability and functionality.
Because a mixture of pharmaceuticals—
particularly antibiotics—is likely to pass
through STPs during a pandemic, the risk of
inhibition of ﬂoc or bioﬁlm formation could
be even greater. Also, the generation of OC
resistance in avian inﬂuenza–infected wildfowl
after exposure to OC-contaminated river water
would be difficult to manage because of the
migratory nature of the hosts. 
Further pandemics could be avoided with a
concerted research effort including robust pre-
paredness plans, especially the use of antivirals.
The proportion of the population receiving
Tamiﬂu could be higher than the 25% consid-
ered by Singer et al. (2007). Although it is
inevitable that drug-resistant forms of the
inﬂuenza virus will occur, strains of inﬂuenza
that are resistant to pharmaceuticals have been
found to have compromised biological ﬁtness
(Aoki et al. 2007).
The principles of environmental assess-
ment processes have been reported by the
EMEA (2006). Regarding the current regula-
tory framework for predicted no-effect con-
centration (PNEC) and PEC assessments for
human pharmaceuticals in various countries,
Europe emphasizes chronic effects assessment
in algae, crustaceans, and fish, whereas the
United States focuses on the assessment of
acute effects. The European Centre for
Ecotoxicology & Toxicology of Chemicals
(ECETOC 2007) argues for intelligent strate-
gies for chronic ecotoxicity testing that reﬂects
the mode-of-action protein target(s) of a given
chemical (e.g., agrochemical, biocide, pharma-
ceutical). For example, chronic testing of
estrogenic drugs should include aquatic ani-
mal species that are known to have estrogen
receptors. Wider use of the mode-of-action
intelligent testing strategy approach as an
alternative to routine lethality testing would
provide important animal welfare and eco-
nomic beneﬁts while simultaneously providing
a sound scientific rationale for calculating
PNECs for OE-P, OC, and other important
human pharmaceuticals.
Unpublished results from ongoing
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) environmental degra-
dation and toxicity tests on environmentally
and physiologically relevant mixtures of OE-P
and OC were presented. The available data
indicate that most of the dose received by the
human population will pass through sewage
treatment works and therefore enter surface
waters, with negligible removal from the water
column to sediments. Chronic ecotoxicity
testing has been conducted in light of the
2006 EMEA guidelines on environmental risk
assessment for human pharmaceuticals requir-
ing PNECs based on chronic data (EMEA
2006) and the projected ≥ 8 weeks of OC
release into receiving rivers during a pandemic
(Singer et al. 2007). These chronic ecotoxicity
tests were performed with green algae
(Pseudokirchneriella subcapitata) in a growth
inhibition test, with Daphnia magna in a
reproductive toxicity study, and with zebraﬁsh
in an early-life-stage test, all following OECD
guidelines 201 (OECD 1984), 211 (OECD
1998), and 210 (OECD 1992), respectively,
Singer et al.
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Figure 1. Government Tamiflu targets for population coverage (%). These values include the number of
antiviral treatments that governments have stockpiled or intend to stockpile, as a percentage of the total
country population. These values are publicly available either via national pandemic plans or media
releases; they may not be a true reﬂection of actual stockpiles (i.e., some governments may have stockpiled
more but have not publicly communicated updated ﬁgures); include only countries that have or intend to
stockpile for > 5% of their population; and include antiviral stockpiles (in some cases the coverage includes
Tamiﬂu and Relenza, and in others only Tamiﬂu as of November 2007).
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Practice quality assurance. The preliminary no
observed effects concentrations (NOECs)
resulted in a PNEC of 100 µg/L, applying an
assessment factor of 10. This PNEC is higher
than published PECs (Singer et al. 2007) or
those newly calculated using worst-case pan-
demic use assumptions and various algorithms.
Hence, based on recognized environmental risk
assessment procedures as detailed in the
European Union Technical Guidance Document
on Risk Assessment (European Commission
2003), risk from OE-P and OC in the scenarios
presented appear to be negligible, including the
low-dilution scenario in the River Lee in the
United Kingdom (Singer et al. 2007). 
The U.K. Environment Agency does not
have any role in the licensing of human
pharmaceuticals or the environmental safety
assessments required by the regulatory process.
In the United Kingdom the responsibility for
issuing licenses lies with the Medicines and
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency
(MHRA). Furthermore, the Environment
Agency has no advisory role in this process. By
contrast, the Environment Agency acts as an
advisor to the relevant competent authorities
for pesticides, biocides, and veterinary pharma-
ceuticals for issues relating to environmental
safety. The program of work on human
pharmaceuticals lies within the Environment
Agency’s responsibility for assessing and report-
ing on the state of the environment, as well as
identifying possible environmental concerns.
This work includes a screening process used to
rank pharmaceuticals based on their relative
risk to the aquatic environment (Environment
Agency 2003, 2008) and a short, targeted
monitoring program conducted for a number
of the higher-priority pharmaceuticals
(Environment Agency 2003). OE-P was not
included in the screening process because of its
low usage in the United Kingdom for routine
treatment. The Environment Agency therefore
conducted a separate assessment for use under
pandemic conditions, drawing on public
information sources. Exposure was estimated
for treatment only and for treatment plus pro-
phylaxis, using assumptions from Singer et al.
(2007) and modified assumptions from the
Department of Health based on treatment of
50% of the population with Tamiﬂu and pro-
phylaxis (Scientific Pandemic Influenza
Advisory Committe 2008). Based on available
data, risk to the aquatic environment from
OE-P and OC appeared low. However, this
requires further investigation for catchments
with high population and low dilution of
sewage effluents in surface waters. The
Environment Agency will review new data
generated on fate and effects of OC (e.g., by
F. Hoffmann-La Roche) before reaching any
further conclusions (T. Boucard, personal
communication).
River water pollution with pharmaceuticals
is relevant in the United Kingdom, particularly
in England, because it is a densely populated,
small island with relatively short low-flow
rivers (Keller et al. 2006). More precise model-
ing is needed to determine specific locations
where local risks to water pollution are greatest.
Hydrologic and demographic factors in the
United Kingdom indicate that the Midlands,
Thames, and Anglian regions of England are
likely at highest risk.
Aim and Objectives
The aim of the workshop was to assess the
implications of Tamiﬂu release to the environ-
ment following mass administration under pan-
demic conditions, and to identify any further
actions required to minimize risks to human
and environmental health.
Four multidisciplinary working groups
addressed the following questions:
1.Does current knowledge about Tamiflu
release to the environment provide suffi-
cient assurance of safety for human health
and the environment?
2. What are the research needs to ensure that
the risks associated with Tamiﬂu release to
the environment can be better understood,
minimized, or mitigated?
3.Of any research requirements identified,
what are the priority research tasks?
4. What are the long-term issues triggered by,
or associated with, the issue of Tamiflu
release to the environment?
Results
Workgroup members were asked to quantify
their assurance of safety with the present
knowledge base on Tamiflu release to the
environment on a scale of 1–5 (where 1 = low
assurance of safety and 5 = high assurance of
safety). The mean ± SD rating for the four
working group sessions was 3.3 ± 0.3.
The highest priority knowledge gaps iden-
tiﬁed by participants fell into four main areas:
a) ecotoxicologic effects; b) antiviral resis-
tance; c) STP failure, particularly as a result of
nontarget neuraminidase inhibition (e.g.,
microorganisms); and d) exposure models to
define realistic worst-case scenarios for envi-
ronmental exposure.
Ecotoxicity. Most participants concluded
that the ecotoxicity of OE-P and OC was not
likely to be an area of primary concern based
on preliminary data (Straub JO, personal com-
munication). Many participants expressed a
desire to see a broader range of ecotoxicologic
work conducted and published in peer-
reviewed journals. However, the level of con-
cern regarding the ecotoxicity was generally
quite low. Considerably greater concern was
expressed regarding the potential inhibition of
nontarget neuraminidases in organisms other
than inﬂuenza viruses (e.g., microorganisms).
Antiviral resistance. Workshop partici-
pants were uncertain about the potential for
generation of OC resistance in avian inﬂuenza
viruses as a result of the exposure of wildfowl
to OC in surface waters. Concerns were some-
what alleviated by the knowledge that OC is
not readily absorbed from the gut and there-
fore should not be present in significant
amounts in the urine to recycle, as proposed by
Singer et al. (2007). The consensus opinion
was that it is difﬁcult to predict the exposure of
OC in the wild fowl gut and its implications
for hastening the generation of OC-resistance
in avian inﬂuenza. However, attending virolo-
gists agreed that reassortment, or mutation,
would be required to generate a virus with
human speciﬁcity, and such viruses would have
to ﬁnd a path to circulate back to humans. The
actual risk to the human population is unlikely
to be signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, the possibility
of OC resistance arising in inﬂuenza viruses in
waterfowl, although unlikely, cannot be cate-
gorically ruled out. Thus, it is important to
consider the consequences if resistant viruses
should evolve (be selected).
The highest concentrations of OC in river
water will be reached only during relatively
short spells of very high drug usage during an
inﬂuenza pandemic. This can occur only after
thousands of infected patients have been
treated with the drug. Resistant viruses will
inevitably evolve in some of these patients in
advance of any possible selection in waterfowl.
Thus, should the waterfowl be infected with
the pandemic strain, the resistant virus strains
and genetic mutations encoding OC resistance
selected will be common to both species but
selected in humans ﬁrst. A resistant pandemic
virus in waterfowl, alongside the same viruses
already in humans, will have little or no effect
on the human situation. Similar to the situa-
tion in humans, resistant viruses in waterfowl
are likely to be cleared or revert to wild-type
once river OC levels fall and the selection pres-
sure is removed. Available data regarding the
nature of OC resistance indicate that muta-
tions responsible for conferring resistance
severely compromise viral growth and infectiv-
ity (Aoki et al. 2007; Chutinimitkul et al.
2007; Hayden 2006; Hurt et al. 2007; Lipsitch
et al. 2007; Yen et al. 2005). If resistance were
selected or acquired by reassortment in other
avian virus strains, again the resistant viruses
would likely revert to wild-type once selection
pressure was removed. If for some reason this
did not happen and the resistant virus persisted
as one of the avian virus strains circulating in
waterfowl, then its chance of becoming a
human pathogen (by chance mutation or
recombination) would be no greater than that
for any of the other 16 avian inﬂuenza A virus
serotypes in circulation. Such events are rare;
highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses have been cir-
culating and infecting the occasional human
Assessment of Tamiflu release to the environment 
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and the virus has still not achieved the capabil-
ity of transmitting between humans. Thus, the
idea of a “second wave” pandemic arising by
this mechanism is considered highly unlikely.
There is concern that nonpandemic strains
might not be a good predictor of how a pan-
demic strain of influenza could develop,
because the possibility of developing compen-
satory mutations could allow an OC-resistant
pandemic strain to grow and infect in an
uncompromised manner. There appears to be
a gap between the perceptions of nonvirologists
working in this ﬁeld and the views expressed
by virologists that emergence of resistance is
unlikely to pose a threat.
STP failure. In the event of an inﬂuenza
pandemic, STPs will receive approximately
10-fold higher concentrations of OC (and
other antiviral or antimicrobial compounds)
than is projected to occur in rivers (Singer et al.
2007), because the STP efﬂuent is diluted by
river ﬂow. This higher concentrations will pose
a widespread problem to STPs if these com-
pounds inhibit the process organisms during a
pandemic. One of the concerns is that OC
might exhibit activity on neuraminidases pro-
duced by bacteria within STPs. Because there
are potential analogous receptors that might
respond to the release of Tamiﬂu, it would be
prudent to assess the nontarget “activity” of the
drug. Tamiflu is an NAI that was rationally
designed to inhibit the inﬂuenza A and B neu-
raminidase; however, there is a basis for consid-
ering that a neuraminidase present in a
bacterium could also be inhibited by Tamiﬂu.
Soong et al. (2006) demonstrated the efﬁcacy
of OC and a similar antiviral, peramivir, to
inhibit bioﬁlm formation in the microorgan-
ism Pseudomonas aeruginosa. These authors
were interested in the potential to use the NAI
for alleviating symptoms of cystic fibrosis,
hence they did not investigate environmentally
relevant concentrations of OC. Nevertheless,
they found that 1 µg/L OC demonstrated a
0.6-fold inhibition of bioﬁlm formation, which
might be applicable to concentrations in STPs
during an influenza pandemic (Soong et al.
2006). This demonstration of the importance
of bacterial neuraminidases in bioﬁlm forma-
tion indicates the possible vulnerability of STP
bioﬁlms to OC exposure during a pandemic.
There are additional concerns regarding STP
failure because of the potential scale of anti-
biotic use to treat secondary infections stem-
ming from influenza-infected patients,
although the use of antivirals might decrease
the need for antibiotic use (Kaiser et al. 2003;
Nicholson et al. 2000; Treanor et al. 2000;
Whitley et al. 2000). 
Changes in activated sludge ﬂoc integrity
or the bioﬁlms in trickling ﬁlter works could
lead to a loss of effective sewage treatment.
This would have catastrophic environmental
consequences, as untreated sewage entering
rivers would kill a large number of the aquatic
organisms and be an additional threat to
human health. Another concern is that
restarting sewage works with fresh cultures is
a difﬁcult process. 
Exposure models. One example of routine
use of OE-P for seasonal influenza is Japan,
which maintains the highest use of NAIs of
any country in the world. Greater than 90% of
the prescriptions for seasonal influenza in
Japan are for OE-P (Moscona and McKimm-
Breschkin 2007). Sewage works in Japan have
been processing OC from 5–10% population
treatment per annum for > 4 years. There is
concern regarding this use pattern and whether
sufficient OC is released into rivers within
Japan to generate an OC-resistant strain even
before the onset of a pandemic. However, the
risk posed by the generation of OC-resistance
in the environment from OC-containing
sewage effluent is likely to be low, for the
aforementioned reasons. Japan might provide
an opportunity to test the validity of the model
systems used to predict river levels of OC dur-
ing high drug usage and to examine the long
term effect of high OC levels on sewage treat-
ment efﬁciency and bioﬁlms in real life situa-
tions. Swabbing of wildfowl in Japan for
OC-resistant virus could be conducted to
detect resistance events, but as these are likely
to be rare, the results of such a study would be
equivocal without very high sample numbers.
Conclusions
By assembling a wide range of relevant exper-
tise, Tamiﬂu and the Environment: Implica-
tions of Use under Pandemic Conditions
provided a unique opportunity to make a pre-
liminary holistic assessment of whether safety
for the environment and human health can be
assured if Tamiflu is used under pandemic
conditions. Although questions of safety assur-
ance depend on professional judgment, the
consensus of this workshop was that OE-P
and OC release into the environment might
still pose risks associated with the generation
of antiviral resistance or destabilization of
microbial bioﬁlms that are key to the perfor-
mance and function of STPs. The risk of OC
resistance in wildfowl seems to be less signiﬁ-
cant than the effects of mixtures of pharma-
ceuticals in sewage and the sewage treatment
process. This is a critical issue given the
unprecedented quantities of analgesics, anti-
inﬂammatory drugs, antipyretics, antibiotics,
and antivirals likely to be used in a pandemic.
The case of seasonal use of Tamiﬂu in Japan
might provide a valuable surrogate for assess-
ing the implications of release under pandemic
conditions, as well as validating models.
Potential inhibition of microbial neu-
raminidases raised additional questions pertain-
ing to the pharmaceutical regulatory process:
First, should additional tests be performed on
“nontarget” organisms (e.g., bacteria) and sce-
narios (e.g., STPs) based on the mode of
action? Second, should the environmental
safety of pharmaceuticals be speciﬁcally evalu-
ated for pandemic scenarios, where appropriate? 
The assessment of pharmaceutical release
to the environment, particularly that projected
to occur under epidemic or pandemic condi-
tions, requires the integration of a diverse
range of scientific expertise across a range of
public and private organizations. As part of
this, national environmental regulators should
play a more active role informing international
and national authorities governing pharma-
ceutical use. Clearly, the implications for the
water industry of potentially large quantities of
antimicrobial products entering STPs need to
be assessed more carefully.
The risk scenarios proposed here are not
unique to Tamiflu or to an influenza pan-
demic, but to all future epidemics and pan-
demics. Hence, the output of the workshop
provides an initial effort toward developing
fully integrated preparedness plans that con-
sider all facets of human and environmental
health.
Recommendations
Recommendations from Tamiflu and the
Environment: Implications of Use under
Pandemic Conditions are as follows:
• The vulnerability of STPs should be exam-
ined regarding exposure to the predicted
concentrations of OC and antibiotics during
a pandemic.
• All newly generated environmental fate and
ecotoxicologic data for OC and OE-P, along
with an environmental risk assessment,
should be collated and published in a peer-
reviewed scientiﬁc journal. 
• More detailed models should be used to
assess the highest likely environmental con-
centrations of OC and associated anti-
microbials both in STPs and in catchments
known to have low dilution. 
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